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Abstract. The numerical algorithm is presented for solving differential problem formulated as the 
Mean-Field Game (MFG) with the coupled system of two parabolic partial differential equations: 
the Fokker-Plank-Kolmogorov equation and the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman one. The case is 
considered with correlation of the considered stochastic processes. The description focuses on the 
discrete semi-Lagrangian approximation of these equations and on the application of the MFG 
theory directly at discrete level. The constructed algorithm is implemented to the problem of carbon 
dioxide pollution as an illustration. 
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1   Introduction 
The Mean-Field Game (MFG) approach is theoretically developed in papers by J.-M. Lasry and P.-
L. Lions [1-2]. A “historical” information on the rapid development of this area of investigations is 
presented in the brief monograph [3] providing mathematical analysis. This approach has been 
adapted to many problems in physics, biology, engineering, and economics [1-9]. In the problem 
formulated here, the mean-field equilibrium is described by the coupled system of two parabolic 
partial differential equations: the Fokker-Plank-Kolmogorov (FPK) equation and the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) one. 
In this paper, we focus on the discrete approximation of these equations and on an application 
of the MFG theory directly at discrete level. Contrary to difference schemes applied by other 
authors, we propose the semi-Lagrangian approximation which improves some properties of a 
discrete problem of this type. Earlier this approximation was used for solving the same type of one-
dimensional problem [6]. 
2   The mathematical model 
We shall not derive the differential statement of the MFG problem and refer the reader to 
comprehensive book [3] for the general description. We begin with the Kolmogorov equation 
(which is called Fokker-Plank one in other content) for the density ( , , )m t x y  of “atomized” agents 
on the rectangle 
1 2(0, ) (0, )H H  at time segment [0, ].t T  The term “atomized” means that each 
of infinite agents has no influence on the situation (because of its zero measure support) but chooses 
the rational strategy that takes into account its own position and the agents’ distribution ( , , )m t x y . 
This approach produces the following managerial problem [3]. 
Put 1 2(0, ) (0, )H H    with the boundary   and the closure   . First, we introduce 
the forward FPK problem [8]: 
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where m n   means the normal derivative at boundary points of  . Here 
1 20, 0    are fixed 
constants characterizing the probable noises produced by the Brownian motion [7] and ( 1, 1)    
is a coefficient of correlation for these stochastic processes. The control functions  
( , , ), ( , , )t x y t x y   reflect the efforts directed towards the decreasing of m . Besides, (2) defines the 
initial density of agents on   and provides the stay of agents on a “feasible” closed domain   at 
each moment of time and interferes their exit out of limits. 
In the model used, we want to minimize the cost functional 
 2 21 2
0
( , , ) exp( ) 2 2 ( , , , ) d d .
T
J m rt d m d m g t x y m t   

         (3) 
Here 
1 2,d d  are positive constants; nonnegative r  is the risk-free discount rate. For function 
( , , , )g t x y m  we demand its concavity in argument m : 
 ( , , , ) ( , , , ) ( , , , ) with ( , , , ) ( , , , )g t x y m g t x y m m m f t x y m f t x y m g m t x y m       (4) 
for all admissible values of other arguments. 
So, we get the optimization problem 
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for the initial and the boundary conditions (2). 
Here we briefly describe a formal way to get the optimality conditions for this differential 
problem. The rigorous derivation can be found in [3]. We will not use these differential 
justifications in our algorithms and give them only as the clear illustration for our considerations at 
discrete level. 
Take an arbitrary function ([0, ] )v C T  , multiply (1) by it, and integrate by parts with 
respect to t  and x : 
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taking into account the boundary condition similar to (2) 
0 on [0, ]v n T    .         (7) 
In addition to the cost functional, we also formulate the Lagrangian of problem (5) 
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Thus, the minimization problem (5) may be rewritten [7] as the saddle point problem 
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After “differentiation” with respect to some functions, we get the backward HJB equation with the 
initial and boundary conditions: 
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which characterizes a saddle point [3] in addition to (1)-(2). 
3   The numerical solution of the FPK equation 
So, we have to solve problem (1)-(2) with the functions   and   satisfying the property 
0 on [0, ]T     due to (11) and (12). Introduce discrete uniform grids in time and in space: 
, 0,..., , ;kt k k M T M    1 2 1 1 1 1 1( 1 2) , 1,..., , ;ix i h i N h H N       
1 2 2 2 2 2( 1 2) , 1,..., , ;j xy j h j N h H N       for integers 1 2, , 2.M N N   Denote 
1 2, 1 2 1 2 1 2( , )i j i jx y   z  and put  1 2, 1 2 1 2; 1,..., , 1,...,h i j i N j N     = z  and 
 1 2, 1 2 1 2; 0,..., 1, 0,..., 1h i j i N j N     = z . Introduce also the points 1 1, 0,..., ;ix ih i N     
2 2, 0,..., .jy jh j N   
We shall find a solution to this problem as a grid function ( , , )hm t x y  at each time level 
kt  on 
h . Split the approximation of equation (1) into two parts. First, consider the operator along axis 
Ox: 1 2 ( )m t m x    . To approximate it at time level kt  for each node 1 2, 1 2i j h  z , fix 
1 2jy   and use the approximation by analogy to paper [10] at plane 1 2jy y  : 
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The point in a subscript means that any appropriate value may be taken in this position. Now 
consider the operator along axis Oy: 1 2 ( )m t m y    . To approximate it at time level kt  for 
each node 
1 2, 1 2i j h  z , fix 1 2ix   and use the approximation analogous to (14) at plane 1 2ix x  : 
1 2, 1 2 1 2, 1 2 1 2, 1 2
, 1 2, 1 2 1, 1 2 1, 1 2, 1 2 1, 1 2 1, 1 2, 1 2 1, 3 2 1, 1 2, 3 2
h i j h i j h i j h
k i j k j k i j k j k i j k j k i jm m m m   
     
                     (16) 
where 
   
 
1 2, 1 2 1 2, 1 2
1, 1 2, 1 2 1, 1 2, 2 1, 1 2, 1 2 1, 1 2, 1 1, 1 2, 2
1 2, 1 2
1, 1 2, 3 2 1, 1 2, 1 1 2
2 , 2 ,
2 ,
i j i j
k i j j k i j k i j k i j k i j
i j
k i j k i j j
y y h y y h
y y h
   
 
      
            
  
      
   
 
 (17) 
   1, 1 2, 1, 1 2, 1, 1 2, 1 1 1, 1 2, 1max 0,2 and max 0,2k i j j k i j k i j j k i jy y b y y b                . 
Now consider the approximation of diffusion part 
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The most part of discrete approximations is not appropriate for our demands since the 
approximation must produce self-adjoint operator with M-property. Therefore, we take the stencil 
of different scheme dependent on sign of  . Introduce the expressions 
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with the 9-point scalar product between corresponding entries and first, treat the case 0.   Put 
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boundary of the ratio 2 1h h . In the case 0   we take other coefficients: 
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Inequalities (20) ensure non-positive off-diagonal coefficients. In both cases we have the 
approximation of order 
2 2
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with initial condition 
, 1 2, 1 2 0 1 2 1 2 1 2( , ) 0,..., 1, 0,..., 1.
h
k i j i jm m x y i N j N             (23) 
For any node 
1 2, 1 2 \
h h
i j   z  outside of the domain  , we put 
, 1 2, 1 2 , 1 2, 1 2
h h
k i j k i jm m            (24) 
with the nearest node 
1 2, 1 2
h
i j   z  to ensure Neumann discrete boundary condition. We will 
exclude values with arguments out of a rectangle by means of (24) and designate the remained 
system of the linear algebraic equations as 
, , 0, ,
h hm m    A F          (25) 
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4   The discrete optimal conditions 
Instead of cost functional (3), introduce the discrete one 


1 21 11
1 , 1 2, 1 2 , 1 2, 1 2
0 0 0
2 , 1 2, 1 2 , 1 2, 1 2 , 1 2, 1 2 1 2
( , , ) exp( ) 2
2
N NM
h h h h h h
k k i j k i j
k i j
h h h
k i j k i j k i j
J m rt d r m
d s m g h h
 

 
   
  
     
 
 
 
   (27) 
for 
2 2 2 2
, 1 2, , , , 1, , , 1 2 , , , , 1
, 1 2, 1 2 1 2 1 2 , 1 2, 1 2
( ) 2 ( ) 2, ( ) 2 ( ) 2,
( , , , ).
h h h h h h
k i k i k i k j k j k j
h h
k i j k i j k i j
r s
g g t x y m
            
     
   

   (28) 
Note that we have the approximations of the second order in ,x y  and the first order in t . 
Thus, we have the discrete problem for the minimization of (27) with condition (25): 
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To formulate the discrete optimal control problem, introduce a discrete function 
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We omit intermediate considerations at discrete level that are analogous to the differential ones 
(5)-(12) and derive the system of discrete equations characterizing optimal condition: 
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        
 

       
 (30) 
for the initial data 
 
, ,
h
Mv    0            (31) 
where 
 , 1 2, 1 2 1 2 1 2 , 1 2, 1 2 1 , 1 2, 1 2 2 , 1 2, 1 2exp( ) ( , , , ) 2 2 .h h h hk i j k k i i k i j k i j k i jb rt f t x y m d r d s              (32) 
Again, for any node 
1 2, 1 2 \
h h
i j   z  (outside of the domain  ), we put 
, 1 2, 1 2 , 1 2, 1 2
h h
k i j k i jv v            (33) 
with the nearest node 
1 2, 1 2
h
i j   z  in accordance with zeroth Neumann boundary condition. 
Differentiating with respect to 
, ,
h    and , ,
h   gives equalities 
 
 
, , , 1 2, , 1 2, 1 1 1
, , , , 1 2 , , 1 2 2 2 2
exp( ) 1,..., 1,
exp( ) 1,..., 1.
h h h
k i k k i k i
h h h
k j k k j k j
rt v v d h i N
rt v v d h j N


    
    
     
    
     (34) 
Note that the calculation in time is performed in the reverse order from 
1 0to .Mt t  
5   The numerical solution of the complete model 
Suppose that some initial approximation 
, , , ,,
h h       , and , ,
hm    are given. For example, we can firstly 
take 
, , , ,,
h h       0 0 . Then, , , 0, ,
h h
km m     for any 1,..., 1k M  . The better approximations of the 
control grid functions 
, , , ,,
h h        may be computed by the following iterative way. 
Iterative algorithm. 
1. Solve (30), (31), (33) 1, 2,...,0k M M     to get 
,
hv  . 
2. Compute , , , ,and
h h
k k      by (34) for 0,..., 1k M  . 
3. Compute 
, ,
hm    by (25). 
4. Compute ( , , )h h h hJ m    by (27). 
5. If ( , , ) ( , , )h h h h h h h hJ m J m Tol      then { , , , , , , , ,: ; : ;
h h h hm m               go to 1}. 
6. Take 
, , , ,,
h h       , and , ,
hm    as an approximate solution of (29). 
Now we give the hint to demonstrate that (34) ensures the steepest descent of the above 
estimate for the difference between values of discrete cost functional. Consider two controls: fix 
,h h   and vary ,h h  . Take , , ,h h h hr r s s  from (28) and the solutions hm , hm of discrete 
problem (25). Find the difference between two values of the discrete functional 
( , , ) ( , , )h h h h h h h hJ m J m    . Imply the concavity of the function g  with respect to m  and 
disintegrate each addend in the right-hand side into independent parts with respect to every 
, , 1 2 , 1 2,and
h h
k i j k i j    like in [6]. First, the minimization of this difference independently decays into 
the minimization of the quadratic polynomials. Second, the coefficients of the principal term in 
, , 1 2 , 1 2,,
h h
k i j k i j    are strictly positive. Thus, the minimum for each of them is reached at points 
 
 
1 1
, , , , , , , 1 2, , 1 2, 1 1 1
2 2
, , , , , , , , 1 2 , , 1 2 2 2 2
2 exp( ) 1,..., 1,
2 exp( ) 1,..., 1.
h h h
k i k i k i k k i k i
h h h
k j k j k j k k j k j
q p rt v v d h i N
q p rt v v d h j N


      
       
       
      
 
One can see that these minimization points indeed coincide with the computed in the iterative 
algorithm. 
At first glance, it seems that the coincidence of equalities (34) and the condition of 
minimization is a natural consequence of approximation of the differential problem. However, this 
coincidence is not automatic for many other difference schemes (see, for example, [5, 6]) for which 
additional inner iterations or corrections are necessary. 
Taylor expansion at the point 
, 1 2, 1 2k i j z  demonstrates the approximation order of ( )O h   for 
scheme (22)-(24). Due to the M-matrix property, the scheme is stable and provides the accuracy of 
( )O h   in 
1( )L   norm. The same conclusion is valid for the difference scheme (30)-(33). 
6   The model 
The agents of our model are the producers. Each of them is associated to a production at time 
t , denoted by ( )q t  which results in amount of emission ( )e t . Generally speaking, an increase in 
production can result in more emissions and vice versa. So, it is reasonable to use the emission as a 
state variable instead of production (see, e.g., [9]). The dynamics of agent’s emission ( )e t  
corresponds to the following controlled process: 
 1 1 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , (0) ,tde t l t dt dW t dN e t e e          (35) 
where ( )l t  is the level of emission reduction and 1 1( )dW t  is its stochastic disturbance. It results 
from technological innovations, market fluctuation, and some other uncertain factors. Here 1( )W t  is 
a standard Brownian motion and 1  is a noise parameter.  ( )tN e t  is the reflection part which 
guarantees for the process to stay in 
min max[ , ]e e  determined by production capacity of an agent [6, 
7, 9]. Another dynamic state of the system is the amount of the permitted emission ( )x t . Let the 
agents try their best to negotiate between them to pursue the highest level of the permitted emission. 
The effort level is represented by ( )t . The permitted emission ( )x t  follows the stochastic process 
 2 2 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , (0) .tdx t t dt dW t dN x t x x           (36) 
Here 2 2 ( ) dW t  is the stochastic disturbance in which 2 ( )W t  is dependent on 1( )W t  with correlation 
[0,1)  .  ( )tN x t  is the reflection part which guarantees for the process to stay in min max[ , ]x x . It 
is determined by the police makers of the cap-and-trade police. 
Assume that all agents have the same capacity in production and negotiation but make different 
decisions. The states e  and x  of the producers continuum at time t  are distributed in 
min max min max[ , ] [ , ]  e e x x  with the probability density function ( , , )m t e x . The initial density 
0 ( , )m e x  is given. We mention that a given agent cannot influence the distribution of all players’ 
state, but it can produce a piece of information which has an effect on decision made by others. 
The agents’ net revenues include five parts: the production revenue, the cost of emission 
reduction, the cost of pursuing permitted emission, the cost of the carbon tax, and the carbon 
trading. The production revenue of agent is    2max 1 2 min max( , , ) 2 , [ , ],Y t e m e e e c c m e e e     
where 
1c  and 2c  are positive constants. Agent’s marginal revenue is positive and decreasing with 
respect to the density m . This property is related to an economic concept “negative externality”. 
The cost of emission reduction and negotiation for the permitted emission are 2
1( ) ( )eC l d l t  and 
2
2( ) ( ),nC l d t respectively. Here 1d  and 2d  are positive constants and the quadratic form 
guarantees increasing marginal costs. 
The cost of carbon tax is ( , , ) ( )min{ ( ), ( )}a aC t e x p t e t x t  where ( )ap t  denotes the tax rate. If 
the emission amount ( )e t  is less than permission level ( )x t , the agent should pay the carbon tax of 
his emission. If the emission amount ( )e t  is more than ( )x t , the agent should pay the carbon tax of 
the basic part. However, the permission of the exceed part should be brought by the carbon trading 
mechanism expressed by the fourth part of revenue  ( , , ) ( ) ( ) ( )b bC t e x p t e t x t

   where the 
emission permits price ( ) ( )b ap t p t . 
After summation, the net revenue of agent at time t  is 
 2 21 2( , , , , , ) ( , , ( , , )) ( )min{ , } ( ) .a bf t e x l m Y t e m t e x d l d p t e x p t e x 

       
The agents can adjust their strategies ( )l t  and ( )t  to maximize their expected discounted 
revenues over the time segment [0, ]T . When the probability density function is not related with the 
control variables, we have the optimal control problem [7] 
   0( ), ( )max exp( ) , ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), , ( ), ( )
T
l t t
rt f t e t x t l t t m t e t x t dt

     (37) 
subject to (35), (36) where 0r   is the risk-free discount rate.  
Consider the above problem from the microscopic point of view, then the optimal control for 
the continuum of agents is expressed as 
   0( ), ( )sup exp( ) , ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), , ( ), ( ) d d .
T
l t t
rt f t e t x t l t t m t e t x t m t



      (38) 
In order to rewrite this problem in the form of (5), we produce linear substitution 
min min( , )e e x x   by variables ( , )x y  and take the minus before f  to change supremum in (38) for 
infimum in (5). Then put l    and   ; etc. After these substitutions, this task coincides with 
the statement of previous sections. 
So, the formulated problem (35)–(38) can be written in the form (5) with the application of 
numerical algorithms of section 5. 
7   Conclusion 
Thus, we suggest the discrete approximation of the MFG problem which completely inherited 
the basic properties of the differential problem simultaneously with the approximation of each 
differential equation. The approximations of direct FPK and inverse HJB problems have adjoint 
operators which are monotone in corresponding adjoint vector spaces. And the discrete 
approximation (34) of differential connection (12) for the minimization of the cost functional gives 
the condition for steepest descent of the discrete cost functional. 
Finally, this approach gives a direct and simple rule for the minimization of the cost 
functional, which accelerates the convergence of algorithm in comparison with other difference 
approximations [5, 6]. 
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